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Technology Mergers and Acquisitions in the
Presence of An Installed Base: A Strategic Analysis
Abstract
We study the strategic benefits of M&A when competing IT vendors sell different
generations of the same product with different quality. We assume the new product
arrives unexpectedly when an installed base of old product exists. We show that the
combination of consumers’ purchase history and heterogeneity leads to new demand
complexity that gives rise to innovative product strategies. We find that shelving
the old product is an important motivation for M&A. The acquirer may exercise
static or intertemporal price discrimination depending on whether it can exercise
upgrade pricing. M&A may speed up or slow down new product consumption,
and it can lead to delayed new product introduction in some markets. However,
it always increases the acquirer’s profit and can sometimes help maximize social
welfare. We discuss relevant managerial and policy implications.
Key words: Mergers and acquisitions, installed base, depreciation, price discrim-
ination
1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are rife in information technology (IT) industries. The
global M&A deals in the IT industry reached $459.6 billion in 2015 (EY, 2015). Many
of these M&A deals involve new technologies or patents. For example, Oracle acquired
Eloqua and Compendium in 2012–2013 to add new capabilities to its cloud-based online
marketing platform. Microsoft acquired Skype in 2011 to expand its presence in the in-
stant messenger and voice over IP market. It also acquired Fox Software for its celebrated
FoxPro database package in early 1990s. These M&A help the acquirers strengthen their
product portfolios and expand their customer bases.
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However, M&A can be costly. Oracle paid $810 million to acquire Eloqua, a 31%
premium over Eloqua’s prevailing trading price in the stock market, when Eloqua had
yet to post a profit. Microsoft paid $8.56 billion to acquire Skype when Skype was
barely profitable and Microsoft itself already had a strong presence via its Windows Life
Messenger in the instant messaging and video- and voice-chat markets.1 These high stake
M&A deals beg the questions: In addition to acquiring new technologies or increasing
market shares, do the acquirers obtain other strategic benefits from M&A? If so, what is
the nature of these benefits? How do such M&A affect social welfare?
To analyze the strategic benefits of technology M&A, we need to identify its unique
features. First, the acquirer will inherit the existing customers from the acquired firm. It
has to plan for its future products and pricing in view of these customers’ preferences and
the installed base of old products that they possess. People using Microsoft’s Windows
Live Messenger may be less willing to pay for Skype calls, and people with FoxPro will
have a lower need for Microsoft’s future database products.
Second, many IT products feature continuous upgrades with improved functional-
ity or quality. Hence, different consumers may prefer different product generations at
different time and may buy multiple generations of the same product over time (Dogan
et al., 2011; Goettler and Gordon, 2011; Mehra et al., 2012). Consumers who have more
urgent needs for online marketing solutions may be willing to purchase Eloqua’s services
and subsequently upgrade to use Oracle’s platform solutions. Other consumers may wait
and use Oracle’s integrated platform solutions at a later time.
Third, there is economic obsolescence, meaning the product will “expire” after a
certain period of time, perhaps because of discontinuation of support services or retire-
ment or obsolescence of the complementary platform needed for product consumption
1 For the Oracle and Microsoft acquisitions, see Wall Street Journal “Oracle to Buy Eloqua in $810
Million Deal,”December 20, 2012, and Wired.com“Microsoft Buys Skype for $8.5 Billion. Why, Exactly?”
May 10, 2011.
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(Lee and Lee, 1998). For example, it may no longer be safe to use Windows XP because
of unbeknown security vulnerabilities after Microsoft discontinued its support in 2014.
An Apple iPhone may stop functioning after its battery dies in a few years.
These characteristics imply that despite a vendor can evade competition by ac-
quiring a rival firm, it will face other challenges such as cannibalization and product
obsolescence. Although the existing literature has variously analyzed related problems, it
lacks specific consideration for the IT industry – limited product lifespan due to economic
obsolescence, negligible marginal costs, co-existence of multiple product generations, and,
most importantly, rapid pace of R&D from different parties leading to innovative solutions
that are often unanticipated by incumbent vendors and that spawn new opportunities for
M&A. In particular, because of overlapping product generations, a vendor selling a new
product often faces a partially-covered market, i.e., only some but not all consumers own
the old product. This incomplete coverage allows different vendors to sell old and new
products to different consumers at different time, leading to many possibilities of static
and intertemporal price discrimination. In such a setting, M&A may bring new benefits
that have not been well explicated in the prior literature.
In this study, we analyze the strategic options available to an acquirer after M&A
and evaluate whether it brings benefits to consumers and social welfare. We start by
analyzing a benchmark competition model where two vendors compete to sell two gen-
erations of a product with differing quality. The incumbent sells a low quality “old”
product followed by an entrant selling a high quality “new” product. The vendors sepa-
rately decide whether, when, and how much to sell their products. We then compare the
outcome of this benchmark with another similar setting where the vendors can form a
coalition through M&A. As is customary with most analysis of IT products, we assume
zero marginal costs (Choudhary, 2010; Xu et al., 2011) and constant product quality in
the products’ lifespan (Lee and Lee, 1998). Our consumers stay in the market through-
out the game. Hence, we extend the vendors’ planning horizon to examine how they can
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dynamically sell their products.
Our model explicitly accommodates an interesting demand dynamics – the service
delivered by the old product tends to make buying the new product less imminent for
existing customers. As the old product depreciates over time, however, these existing
customers may have a higher willingness to pay for the new product than new consumers.
Together with the presence of new consumers, the vendors face an aggregate demand
structure that is highly dynamic and heterogeneous.
We find that in the competitive market, the incumbent will sell the old product
to consumers who have not bought it, but the entrant will target consumers who place
a higher valuation on quality despite they already have the old product. M&A helps
alleviate competition and will often lead to shelving of the old product. More impor-
tantly, it can lead to several interesting product consumption patterns. In some markets,
low type consumers will prefer the new product more than high type consumers in the
early periods, but their preferences will reverse in the latter periods. This unique and
dynamic preference structure presents an opportunity for the acquirer to exercise perfect
intertemporal price discrimination to extract all consumer surplus.
Further, M&A may variously speed up or slow down new product consumption. It
can even cause the new product to be introduced later despite it depreciates over time.
Such delayed new product introduction does not benefit consumers. Nevertheless, we find
that M&A can increase and sometimes even maximize social welfare, which will never
happen in the competitive market. M&A is also economically attractive as the acquirer
will mostly earn a higher profit than the vendors’ combined profits in the competitive
market. Allowing the acquirer to identify existing consumers and offer upgrade pricing
will further strengthen the incentive for the merger.
In addition to M&A, our theory applies to more general settings with an installed
base of old products. Examples include changes in internal management (new manage-
ment inheriting an installed base from predecessors) or the exit of prominent competitors
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in a concentrated market (the remaining vendors then have to face an installed base
created by the exited competitors).2 The common feature of these examples is that the
vendors face an exogenous pool of existing customers and have to make long term prod-
uct and pricing plans. Similarly, our findings help policy makers assess the long-term
effects of M&A in the IT industry, particularly their implications on product upgrade,
replacement and general consumption profiles, and social welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents our research model and characterizes the demand dynamics.
Section 4 reports the analysis and findings. Section 5 discusses the implications of this
research. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
This paper is related to several streams of research in the literature. The first stream
studies how consumer heterogeneity affects dynamic pricing of products (Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki, 2006; Su, 2007; Chen and Pearcy, 2010; Liu, 2010; Liu and Zhang, 2013). In
general, heterogeneity in quality valuation, taste, patience, or purchase history, or strate-
gic consumer behavior affect consumers’ product preferences, leading to various strategies
such as mark up (increasing), mark down (skimming), or penetration pricing. The focus
of these works lies mainly in designing the optimal pricing strategies given specific mar-
ket structures or demand characteristics, but not comparing the firms’ strategies across
market structures (e.g., monopoly vs. duopoly).
Another closely related stream of work studies versioning of software or informa-
tion products (Chen and Seshadri, 2007; Bhargava and Choudhary, 2008; Boulding and
Christen, 2009; Choudhary, 2010; Dogan et al., 2011; Calzada and Valletti, 2012). The
2 For example, after OS/2 was withdrawn from the operating systems market in 2006, Microsoft faced
a sizable pool of consumers who had been using OS/2 in their computer systems. These consumers may
switch or upgrade to future versions of the Windows operating system.
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general conclusion in this literature is that the utility specification of consumers, produc-
tion costs, and demand variability and other market risks may affect firms’ versioning
decisions (see, e.g., Koca et al., 2010; Mehra et al., 2012). The focus of these works lies
in identifying the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for product versioning, but not
whether firms have incentives to ease multi-product competition or facilitate new product
introduction through structural changes such as M&A.
Our research does not focus on product pricing or versioning per se. Instead, we
study the vendors’ strategies when they can variously compete or form a coalition. Our
model adopts some commonly used market characteristics – vertically differentiated prod-
ucts, overlapping product generations, competition, and the possibility to offer upgrade
pricing (Li and Graves, 2012; Mehra et al., 2012; Liu and Zhang, 2013), but we want to
identify and characterize additional product line and pricing strategies available to a coali-
tion. Our setting is related to the one in Goettler and Gordon (2011), which compares
innovation rates and social welfare between monopoly and duopoly in the microprocessor
industry. Unlike Goettler and Gordon (2011), our vendors and consumers are partially
strategic – they are forward-looking and so can plan ahead only for the existing product
(i.e., the one already launched in the market). As we shall see later, this introduces new
complexity that gives rise to many novel results.
Our theoretical foundation is the celebrated literature of price discrimination (Mussa
and Rosen, 1978; Stokey, 1979; Moorthy, 1984), durable goods pricing (Coase, 1972; Bu-
low, 1982, 1986; Waldman, 2003), and time inconsistency (Stokey, 1981; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1998; Lee and Lee, 1998). A common feature in these theories is that the market
is often incompletely covered within the product life cycle, which sets the stage for our
analysis (for a formal analysis, see Besanko and Winston, 1990; Nair, 2007). From there,
we extend the model to allow for dynamic pricing of the new product and M&A in the
presence of an installed base of old products.
Finally, our work is related to the literature in horizontal mergers and technological
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acquisitions. Studies in horizontal mergers mostly analyze the benefit of a merger in
Cournot or Bertrand price setting games (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Perry and
Porter, 1985) or in the presence of market expansion or competition effects (Shaked and
Sutton, 1990). Our study departs from this literature in that the incentive to merge
stems not only from being able to raise prices or expand market potential, but also, the
possibility to manage a broader product portfolio taking into consideration the strategic
dynamics of market demand (Banker et al., 2011).
The technological acquisition literature studies how technology innovation affects
a firm’s pre-acquisition decisions (Zhao, 2009; Ransbotham and Mitra, 2010) and post-
acquisition management (Puranam et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Sears and Hoetker,
2014). A recurring interest has been to relate technology similarity and the gap in knowl-
edge bases between the acquiring and target firms with acquisition performance. The
empirical evidence indicates that redundancy in technology will affect the performance
of the acquirer in the market (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Makri et al., 2010; Sears and
Hoetker, 2014). Our study builds on this literature by assuming the acquirer and target
firms sell different generations of the same product. Hence, the products overlap in the
quality space. We add analytical insights to the empirical literature (Puranam et al.,
2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Sears and Hoetker, 2014) by scrutinizing novels ways to
improve acquisition performance in view of overlapping technology generations. Further,
we extend this literature by considering whether market characteristics such as consumer
heterogeneity or mix would affect acquisition performance.
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3. The Model
An incumbent vendor (“I”) sells an old product (“O”) which delivers a constant quality,
qO, in each of the n periods in its lifespan, n ≥ 3.3 The product’s lifespan is fixed from
the day when it is developed. It will stop functioning after n periods regardless of when
consumers make the purchase. If a consumer buys the product in period t, then she can
use it for only n− t instead of n periods. Let U(·, ·) denote the sum of discounted quality
(utility) provided by the product. The first argument in U(·, ·) is the product’s quality.
The second argument is the product’s remaining lifespan. For simplicity, we assume zero
fixed and marginal costs of production.4
The market consists of dH high (“H”) and dL low (“L”) type consumers, who differ
in their valuations for quality, vH > vL, and dH +dL = 1. The vendor can sell the product
in any period t = 0, 1, ..., n − 1, but it cannot make product or price commitments, or
identify individual consumers (i.e., perfect price discrimination is infeasible). The vendor
and consumers discount future utility by δ, where 0 < δ < 1. Therefore, a product with
quality qi and durability n gives U(qi, n) = qi + δqi + · · ·+ δn−1qi = qi(1−δn)1−δ .
Consider the vendor’s decision. If it wants to sell the product to all consumers
in period 0, it has to charge a penetration price equal to low type consumers’ utility,
vLU(qO, n), which is also its profit because the market size is 1. It will not be able to sell
any product in the future as all consumers will buy the product and leave the market.
The vendor can also exercise intertemporal price discrimination by selling to high
type consumers first followed by selling to low type consumers at a lower price (Besanko
3 The assumption that quality stays constant throughout a product’s lifespan is common in the lit-
erature (see, e.g., Moorthy and Png, 1992; Fishman and Rob, 2000; Goettler and Gordon, 2011). It
particularly fits software products which are prone to economic obsolescence, for example, because of
aging of complementary hardware platforms, instead of physical obsolescence.
4 It is customary to assume zero marginal costs for IT products (see, e.g., Choudhary, 2010; Xu et al.,
2011). It allows us to focus on the firm’s strategic decisions in response to demand variations arising
from the co-existence of multiple versions of the same product, which is typical in the IT industry
(Padmanabhan et al., 1997; Dogan et al., 2011; Li and Graves, 2012).
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and Winston, 1990; Nair, 2007). Suppose high type consumers buy the product in period
0. Then, immediately in period 1, the vendor can sell the product to low type consumers
at price p1 = vLU(qO, n− 1). High type consumers foresee this. Therefore, to incentivize
them to buy the product in period 0, the vendor must ensure they obtain higher utility
from buying in period 0 than buying in period 1, i.e., vHU(qO, n) − p0 ≥ δ[vHU(qO, n −
1) − p1], which implies p0 = vHU(qO, 1) + δvLU(qO, n − 1). Summing over periods 0
and 1, the vendor’s profit from intertemporal price discrimination is dHp0 + dLδp1 =
dH [vHU(qO, 1)+δvLU(qO, n−1)]+dL[δvLU(qO, n−1)] = dHvHU(qO, 1)+δvLU(qO, n−1),
which exceeds its profit from penetration pricing, vLU(qO, n), if and only if dHv
H
L > 1,
where vHL ≡ vHvL > 1 measures consumer heterogeneity (Moorthy and Png, 1992).
Accordingly, when consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous and with sufficient num-
ber of high type consumers, the vendor will prefer selling only to high type consumers
first and defer selling to low type consumers to the next period. In the remaining analysis
we assume these conditions are satisfied.
Assumption 1 dHv
H
L > 1.
Assumption 1 implies monopoly matters as the vendor has an incentive to restrict
output and not sell to low type consumers (Lee and Lee, 1998). When this happens, an
installed base of the old product will form after period 0. Nair (2007) and Liu (2010) show
that video game sellers exercise price skimming, leading to incomplete coverage of the
market before they reduce their products’ prices. Such incomplete coverage is commonly
observed in other digital product markets, such as computer software, e-books and media,
and entertainment, which often comprise consumers with heterogeneous valuations and
vendors with monopolistic pricing power.
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3.1. Game Sequence
By Assumption 1, all high type consumers will buy the old product in period 0. Suppose
in period 1 an entrant (“E”) enters the market with a new product (“N”), which has a
higher quality than the old product but the same durability, n.5 Let 0 < qO < qN = 1.
qO then inversely measures the extent of quality improvement. We further assume rapid
technological development (Dhebar, 1994; Kornish, 2001):
Assumption 2 The technology improves in present-value term, i.e., δqN > qO.
Assumption 2 gives the entrant a stronger incentive to sell the new product ear-
lier and removes the less interesting case where it waits until the incumbent sells to all
consumers before launching the new product.6 We assume the production of the old and
new products are restricted by exclusive patents. Hence, only the incumbent can sell the
old product and the entrant can sell the new product. The only way for either vendor to
sell both products is to acquire the other party.
Starting from period 1, the incumbent and entrant need to decide when to sell their
products and how much to charge in any period t = 1, 2, ..., n. Consumers do not buy the
same product over time, but they can buy the old product and new product sequentially
if doing so gives them higher utility. There is no second-hand market, meaning the old
product is retired and provides zero usage or residual value once a consumer buys the
new product. Figure 1 presents the event timeline.
5 Because the new product is introduced later, it will retire after the old product. Note that if the new
product arrives in any period t > 1, the incumbent would have sold the old product to all consumers
by the time the entrant appears. The entrant would then face a simple pricing problem with trivial
solutions. To focus on the strategic consideration related to M&A, we assume the new product arrives
in period 1. Later, we show that M&A may cause delayed introduction of the new product.
6 For analysis of multi-period pricing of information goods with heterogeneous consumers, see Bhargava
and Choudhary (2008) and Choudhary (2010). An extreme strategy for the entrant is to wait for the old
product to retire before selling the new product in period n for consumers to use it in just one period.
This can be attractive when the discount factor, δ, is sufficiently close to 1 and cannibalization by the old
product is significant, i.e., qO is large. Although theoretically possible, this strategy will cause the two
products to be disconnected in time. Any discussion of competition, acquisition, and product planning
will then become moot. We do not consider such an extreme strategy in this paper.
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Figure 1: Event timeline
We assume the incumbent and consumers do not anticipate the new product in
period 0. This happens when they are myopic or the new product embodies unexpected
new technologies. As argued by Banker et al. (2011, p.2), “...incumbent players are often
blindsided by entrants who introduce products to occupy the incumbents’ blind spot because
the former fail to anticipate all possible threats.”
Assumption 3 The incumbent and consumers do not anticipate the new product.
By Assumptions 1 to 3, high type consumers will buy the old product in period 0.
From period 1 onward, the incumbent can sell the old product to low type consumers.
The entrant can sell the new product to high and/or low type consumers. We apply the
subgame-perfect Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concept in all analysis.
3.2. Demand Characteristic
We first characterize the consumers’ preferences for the new product. If consumer j
does not own the old product, her utility from the new product in period t, t ≥ 1, is
bjNt = vjU(qN , n−t+1). The corresponding discounted utility, BjNt = δt−1bjNt. If consumer
j owns the old product, which has remaining lifespan of n− t in period t, then her utility
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from upgrading to the new product in period t is hjNt = vjU(qN , n−t+1)−vjU(qO, n−t).
The first term in hjNt is the utility she obtains from the new product. The second term
is the remaining consumption value of the old product given that it has been used for t
periods. The corresponding discounted utility, HjNt = δ
t−1hjNt ≤ BjNt, i.e., having the old
product decreases consumer j’s desire to get the new product.
Therefore, if consumer j does not own the old product, then hjNt = b
j
Nt and H
j
Nt =
BjNt. As t increases, b
j
N,t+1 < b
j
Nt and B
j
N,t+1 < B
j
Nt, i.e., she obtains higher utility from an
earlier purchase. We can quantify her marginal utility of waiting, ∆Bjt = B
j
N,t+1−BjNt =
−δt−1vjqN < 0. By contrast, if she owns the old product, her marginal utility of waiting,
∆Hjt = H
j
N,t+1 − HjNt = δt−1vj(qO − qN) < 0, but ∆Hjt > ∆Bjt . Hence, she suffers less
from waiting than those who do not own the old product. This is because the old product
offers consumption benefit before she upgrades to the new product.
By Assumption 1, only high type consumers own the old product upon entering
period 1. They are less willing to buy the new product than low type consumers in a
certain period t if and only if hHNt ≤ bLNt, or vHL ≤ Υ(t) ≡ U(qN ,n−t+1)U(qN ,n−t+1)−U(qO,n−t) . They are
more willing to buy the new product than low type consumers in period t+ 1 if and only
if hHN,t+1 ≥ bLN,t+1, or vHL ≥ Υ(t+ 1) ≡ U(qN ,n−t)U(qN ,n−t)−U(qO,n−t−1) , where Υ(t+ 1) < Υ(t) for all
t. Proposition 1 summarizes this intricate demand dynamics. All proofs are available in
the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose only high type consumers own the old product upon entering
period 1. For any n ≥ 3, there exist vHL and tˆ < n, Υ(tˆ + 1) ≤ vHL ≤ Υ(tˆ), such that
hHNt ≤ bLNt for all t ≤ tˆ and hHN,t ≥ bLN,t for all t ≥ tˆ+ 1.
Figure 2 plots the preferences of consumers with different heterogeneity over time
when n = 20, qO = 0.8, and δ = 0.95. Proposition 1 results from the interaction between
consumer heterogeneity and purchase history. The installed base of the old product
decreases high type consumers’ willingness to buy the new product, but it depreciates over
12
time. Hence, as t increases, the new product gradually becomes more attractive to high
type consumers (cf. low type consumers who do not own the old product). This dynamic
change in relative consumer preferences increases the complexity of intertemporal pricing.
Figure 2: Consumer preferences over time
In particular, when consumer heterogeneity is moderate, viz. Υ(t+1) ≤ vHL ≤ Υ(t),
the preferences of the two consumer types “cross” from period t to period t + 1. To our
knowledge, such preference “crossing” among consumers has not been considered in the
prior literature. It happens when consumers have different purchase histories and the
product is subject to depreciation or economic obsolescence (Lee and Lee, 1998). These
features are common among multi-generation IT products.
4. Analysis
4.1. Competition
The demand dynamics characterized above pose great challenges to both the incumbent
and entrant. The incumbent wants to sell the old product to low type consumers, but
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it has to compete with the entrant who sells a new and better product. The entrant,
in addition to competing with the incumbent, has to tackle the installed base of the old
product if it wants to sell the new product to high type consumers. In this section, we
characterize the equilibrium outcomes when the incumbent and entrant compete with
each other independently to maximize their profits.
In general, three forces suppress the new product’s price. First, the incumbent can
always charge a low price for the old product. This competition from the incumbent
limits the price that the entrant can charge to low type consumers. To sell to low type
consumers, the new product’s price cannot exceed the incremental utility brought by
technological improvement, i.e., pNt ≤ vL[U(qN , n− t+ 1)− U(qO, n− t)].
Second, the installed base of the old product cannibalizes the new product. To sell
to high type consumers, the new product’s price cannot exceed the incremental utility
brought by the new product relative to the remaining consumption value of the old
product, i.e., pNt ≤ vH [U(qN , n− t+ 1)− U(qO, n− t)].
Third, because the entrant cannot make price commitment, it suffers from time
inconsistency, i.e., its incentive to reduce price in the future limits the price that it can
charge in the current period (Stokey, 1981; Fishman and Rob, 2000). Consumers, expect-
ing price reduction, is willing to pay only the time-discounted price in the future plus the
utility obtained from using the new product in the current period. The cannibalization
from the old product further dampens the expected future price of the new product.
The competition makes selling to low type consumers in period 1 unattractive to
the entrant. Instead, the entrant will be better off selling to high type consumers first.
Even then, the price that it can charge will be suppressed because of cannibalization
and time inconsistency. Further, the new product’s price in period 2 is constrained
by cannibalization as, by then, the incumbent would have sold the old product to low
type consumers. Accordingly, all consumers will enjoy a positive surplus. Proposition
2 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes under competition. For brevity, we report the
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equilibrium prices and profits in the Online Supplement.
Proposition 2 Under competition, the incumbent will sell the old product to low type
consumers in period 1. The entrant will sell the new product sequentially to high and low
type consumers in periods 1 and 2. All consumers earn a positive surplus.
Despite the incumbent can sell the old product to low type consumers in period 1,
the price that it can charge is adversely affected by the new product, i.e., it suffers from
the entrant’s competition. The incumbent can charge a high price for the old product
if and only if consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous. Even then, it can only extract
low type consumers’ surplus from using the old product in period 1 instead of the old
product’s full lifespan because low type consumers expect to buy the new product in
period 2. Similarly, because of cannibalization and time inconsistency, the entrant will
always price the new product such that all consumers enjoy a positive surplus.
Proposition 2 gives two interesting insights. First, the entrant will serve high type
consumers first even if they have a lower preference for the new product than low type
consumers because they already have the old product. By not serving low type consumers
immediately, the entrant can avoid competing with the incumbent in period 1. Deferring
selling to low type consumers also allows the entrant to charge a higher price in period
2 as, by then, the old product will worth less because of depreciation. This eases the
old product’s cannibalization of the new product. Essentially, Proposition 2 implies that
when the market is partly covered by an old product, an unforeseen new entrant will
serve consumers with the new product sequentially, according to consumers’ valuation of
quality, regardless of their relative preferences for the new product.7
7 Recall Assumption 1 favors intertemporal price discrimination, which causes the incomplete coverage
of the market upon entering period 1. Proposition 2 may not apply without Assumption 1, but then all
consumers would buy the old product in period 0. This does not seem realistic. In a related setting,
Choudhary (2010) identifies conditions for homogeneous sellers to avoid price competition using different
pricing schemes when consumers are heterogeneous and would buy multiple units of an information
product. Here, consumers buy at most one unit from each vendor, but the entrant can minimize price
competition by timing its product properly. For a classical analysis of how a monopolist vendor can
exploit product timing to alleviate cannibalization, see Moorthy and Png (1992).
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Second, although the entrant will sell the new product immediately in period 1, it
will deliberately price it so that low type consumers will defer purchasing it until period
2. The market will not be efficient as the new product will depreciate despite it is not sold
to low type consumers (whose valuation exceeds its marginal cost, zero). This inefficiency
arises from the entrant’s excessive incentive to avoid competition and the cannibalization
from the installed base of the old product.
4.2. The Benefits of M&A
The analysis above suggests that competition, cannibalization, and time inconsistency
limit the profit that the entrant can earn from the new product. It is difficult to alleviate
time inconsistency without price commitment, but the competition and cannibalization
effects can be reduced if the two vendors can coordinate through a merger. In particular,
price competition will not arise with M&A, and the merged vendor (“acquirer”) can
optimally plan for the entire product line to minimize cannibalization.
In the following analysis, we start by assuming the acquirer cannot offer an upgrade
policy. This happens when the acquirer cannot determine whether consumers have bought
the old product, or when the administration of upgrade is prohibitively costly. We present
the case with an upgrade policy in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1. No Upgrade Policy
Here, the acquirer can charge only one price for each of its products to all consumers.
Proposition 2 establishes the “benchmark” competition outcome. With M&A, the ac-
quirer’s strategy space is broader because it can sell the old product to low type consumers
and the new product to high or low type consumers in any period t = 1, 2, ..., n. Let
Υ1 ≡ U(qN ,1)U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1) , Υ2 ≡
U(qN ,n)
U(qN ,n)−U(qO,n−1) , and Υ3 ≡
U(qN ,n−1)
U(qN ,n−1)−U(qO,n−2) , Υ1 > Υ2 > Υ3.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium outcomes in this scenario.
Proposition 3 With M&A and no upgrade policy, the acquirer will:
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(i) sell the new product to low type consumers in period 1 and high type consumers in
period 2, i.e., {1 : N → L; 2 : N → H}, if and only if
vHL < dLΥ1 or Υ3 < v
H
L <
Υ2
1+
(
1−dL
dL
· U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)
U(qN ,n)−U(qO,n−1)
) , where dLΥ1 ≤ Υ3;
(ii) sell the new product to both high and low type consumers in period 1, i.e., {1 : N →
H,L}, if and only if
dLΥ1 ≤ vHL ≤ Υ3 or Υ21+( 1−dL
dL
· U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)
U(qN ,n)−U(qO,n−1)
) ≤ vHL ≤ Υ1, where Υ3 < Υ21+( 1−dL
dL
· U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)
U(qN ,n)−U(qO,n−1)
) ,
or, when vHL > Υ1, v
H
L ≤ min{ Υ11−dL ,Υ1 +
dL
1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)]} and
vHL ≤ U(qN ,2)−dLU(qO,2)δ(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] when n = 3;
(iii) sell the new product to high type consumers in period 1 and low type consumers in
period 2, i.e., {1 : N → H; 2 : N → L}, if and only if
dL <
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qO,1)
and vHL >
Υ1
1−dL , and v
H
L ≥ dLU(qO,2)−δU(qN ,1)(1−δ)(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] when n = 3.
(iv) sell the old product to low type consumers in period 1, and the new product to high
and low type consumers in periods 2 and 3, i.e., {1 : O → L; 2 : N → H; 3 : N →
L}, if and only if
n = 3, vHL > Υ1, max{ 1(1+δ)qO , 1qO − δ2} < dL < 1, and
U(qN ,2)−dLU(qO,2)
δ(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] < v
H
L < min
{
dLU(qO,2)−δU(qN ,1)
(1−δ)(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] ,
δ(1+dL)U(qO,1)−δU(qN ,1)
(1−δ)(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)]
}
.
(v) sell the old product to low type consumers and new product to high type consumers
in period 1, and the new product to low type consumers in period 2, i.e., {1 : N →
H,O → L; 2 : N → L}, if and only if
dL ≥ δU(qO,n−2)U(qO,1) , vHL > Υ1 +
dL
1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] , and
vHL ≥ δ(1+dL)U(qO,1)−δU(qN ,1)(1−δ)(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] when n = 3
Figure 3 illustrates the outcomes with M&A and no upgrade policy when n = 3,
qO = 0.8, and δ = 0.95. We plot Figure 3 in log scale to show all optimal strategies.
Evidently, the outcomes here are often different from the case with competition (Propo-
sition 2). As shown in Proposition 3(v), the product sequence under competition, i.e.,
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{1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L}, is optimal only if consumers are heterogeneous, i.e.,
vHL is large, and there are many low type consumers, i.e., dL is large.
Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes with M&A and no upgrade policy
One interesting observation from parts (i) to (iii) of Proposition 3 and Figure 3 is
that the acquirer may prefer shelving the old product. When consumers are homogeneous,
selling the old product will severely constrain the price chargeable for the new product.
This is not desirable to the acquirer because consumers value the new product more
than the old product. The M&A can alleviate this cannibalization by discontinuing the
old product. When this happens, ironically, the acquirer obtains the exclusive patent to
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retire instead of selling a product. The M&A serves a strategic but not market expansion
purpose (cf. Shaked and Sutton, 1990).8
Observation 1 The acquirer prefers to shelf the old product in all markets characterized
in parts (i) to (iii) of Proposition 3.
Even if the acquirer shelves the old product, it still has several options to sell the
new product. One intriguing option is to sell the new product to low type consumers
in period 1 and high type consumers in period 2. Importantly, this strategy helps the
acquirer achieve perfect intertemporal price discrimination in some markets.
Observation 2 When Υ3 < v
H
L <
Υ2
1+
(
1−dL
dL
· U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)
U(qN ,n)−U(qO,n−1)
) , the acquirer can extract all
consumer surplus by selling the new product to low type consumers in period 1 and high
type consumers in period 2.
The shaded area in Figure 3 highlights the markets corresponding to Observation
2, which results from the demand dynamics characterized in Proposition 1. Because high
type consumers own the old product, their marginal utility of waiting is higher than that
of low type consumers. Hence, low type consumers value the new product more than
high type consumers in period 1, causing the acquirer to serve them first.
Nevertheless, high type consumers value quality more than low type consumers.
Hence, as the old product depreciates, their valuation for the new product will gradually
exceed that of low type consumers. When Υ3 < v
H
L ≤ Υ2, corresponding to the consumer
heterogeneity in Proposition 1, the valuations of the two consumer types towards the
new product “cross” from period 1 to period 2. This allows the acquirer to fully exercise
its pricing power despite not being able to target consumers individually. With proper
8 This result parallels Proposition 2 of Bhargava and Choudhary (2008), which shows that a monopoly
may not want to version an information product when consumers are homogeneous. Here, as we shall
see in Section 4.3, specifically, Proposition 7, other than not wanting to version, a vendor may even be
willing to pay (acquire a competitor) to shelf the old product.
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prices, low type consumers will buy the new product in period 1 because they would get
negative surplus if they wait. High type consumers will wait until period 2 because their
old product still gives high usage value in period 1. All consumers will get zero surplus.
Note that, in principle, such perfect intertemporal price discrimination is feasible
for all vHL ∈ [Υ3,Υ2]. The acquirer will exercise it only under the condition specified
in Observation 2 because, outside this range, the valuation of high type consumers to-
wards the new product is sufficiently high so that the acquire will prefer selling to them
immediately. It is instructive to compare the product sequences in Observation 2 and
Proposition 2. With competition, the entrant can never extract the full surplus from low
type consumers, so it prefers to serve high type consumers first.
This powerful pricing mechanism results from the dynamic change in consumer val-
uation, not consumer identification instruments such as purchase history (Levinthal and
Purohit, 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998; Lee and Lee, 1998) or cross-market informa-
tion sales (Taylor, 2004; Hermalin and Katz, 2006). To our knowledge, that a vendor
can achieve perfect intertemporal price discrimination without identifying consumers is a
novel result. It comes from the interaction of depreciation and heterogeneous consumer
valuation, both of which are commonly observed in consumer durables or products subject
to economic obsolescence, such as computer software.
Figure 3 shows that perfect intertemporal price discrimination is an optimal strat-
egy in a small set of markets. The enabling characteristics are: (i) consumers have
moderate heterogeneity in quality valuation; (ii) those holding an old product have a
higher valuation towards product quality; (iii) the product is subject to depreciation or
economic obsolescence; (iv) the arrival of the new product is unexpected; and (v) the sales
of the old and new products can be coordinated after the new product arrives, perhaps
via a merger. With these characteristics, the existing consumers who own the old product
will gradually value the new product more than other consumers over time, giving the
monopoly vendor a chance to skim consumers sequentially.
20
Together with Proposition 2, we find an interesting difference in the vendors’ be-
haviors across competition and M&A. Under competition, a new-product vendor will sell
to high valuation consumers first despite they might already own an old product. By
contrast, a merger will sometimes sell to new consumers who have lower valuation for
product quality first. Other than expanding clientele to build critical mass (Clemons and
Weber, 1996; Van de Ven, 2005) or to cultivate network effects (Lee and Mendelson, 2007;
Jiang and Sarkar, 2009; Liu et al., 2011), we show that exercising the price discrimination
power granted by M&A can be a novel motivation.
Proposition 3 also highlights another interesting new strategy.
Observation 3 The acquirer will delay selling the new product in the markets charac-
terized in Proposition 3(iv).
In general, when consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous, the acquirer would want
to sell the new product to high type consumers at a high price. It may want to sell to low
type consumers too when they are prevalent in the market. However, the installed base of
the old product limits the price chargeable to high type consumers in period 1. The low
valuation of low type consumers also makes selling the new product to them in period 1
unattractive. One way to alleviate these pricing constraints is to postpone selling the new
product. This would allow the installed base to depreciate further, and so the acquirer
can charge a higher price for the new product after period 1. The acquirer can sell the
old product to low type consumers in period 1 to make up for the “opportunity loss” from
such deferred selling. This is more likely to happen when dL increases.
Observation 3 provides a novel justification for a paradoxical strategy – delay sell-
ing a new and better product after M&A. Dhebar (1994), Fishman and Rob (2000), and
Kornish (2001) have shown that such delays can help resolve time inconsistency. Here,
the motivation is to alleviate cannibalization from an existing installed base that depre-
ciates over time. Previous studies have not scrutinized this interesting motivation. We
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emphasize that Observation 3 applies despite the new product improves in present value
term (Assumption 2) and the delay does not address time inconsistency.
The practical implication of Observation 3 is that when an existing installed base
cannibalizes a new product, the vendor can delay selling the new product and in the mean
time serve new consumers with the old product. This strategy is attractive when the old
product has short remaining lifespan and there are many new consumers.
Proposition 2 and Observation 3 also imply M&A can slow down the pace of new
product introduction in some markets. This finding echoes the previous literature show-
ing a monopoly may impede new product introduction (Fishman and Rob, 2000; Kornish,
2001). Our analysis adds another perspective to the continuing debate of whether com-
petition affects product innovation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion et al., 2005).
Other than market structure, the path of product purchase and the timing of structural
change, such as a merger, also matter (Goettler and Gordon, 2011).
From Propositions 2 and 3, we see that M&A may variously trigger different product
sequences. With low consumer heterogeneity, it may speed up selling the new product
to low type consumers and lead to shelving of the old product. With high consumer
heterogeneity, a large proportion of low type consumers, and short product lifespan, it
may lead to delayed selling of the new product. Overall, after M&A, low type consumers
can get the new product earlier in a large set of markets whereas all consumers can get
the new product later in a (disjoint) small set of markets.
We next consider how M&A affects social welfare. In our setting, as both products
have zero marginal costs and lifespans of n, and the new product has a higher quality
than the old product, social welfare is maximized if and only if all consumers get the
new product in period 1. This implies only the product sequence, {1 : N → H,L}, can
maximize social welfare. Obviously, it is often not the equilibrium choice.
Proposition 4 Social welfare is not maximized with competition. Without an upgrade
policy, M&A will help maximize social welfare only in the markets characterized in Propo-
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sition 3(ii).
Upon entering the market in period 1, the entrant faces a price war from the
incumbent and the cannibalization from the existing installed base, which tend to erode its
profit from selling the new product (Goettler and Gordon, 2011). To avoid competition,
the entrant will target high type consumers first. This causes inefficiency as low type
consumers also benefit from using the new product earlier. As shown in Proposition 2,
low type consumers will not get the new product in period 1 under competition.
With M&A, the acquirer can minimize the negative impacts caused by competition
and the cannibalization between the two products. However, its incentive to maximize
profits through intertemporal price discrimination remains. Hence, it will still prefer to
disperse selling the new product in different time periods in many markets. As Proposition
4 and Figure 3 suggest, when consumers are heterogeneous and the market contains more
high type consumers, the acquirer often prefers to delay selling the new product to low
type consumers (Goettler and Gordon, 2011).
To summarize, with the presence of an installed base, it is often difficult to maximize
social welfare by coordinating the path of future product introduction and pricing. M&A
may help but is obviously not the solution in all markets.
4.2.2. With Upgrade Policy
We now suppose the acquirer can offer an upgrade price to existing consumers, perhaps
because consumer record is part of the transferred asset in M&A, or the vendor can
identify their sold products in the market. Our setting with upgrade policy is similar
to that in Lee and Lee (1998) and the “semianonymous” case in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1998). The essential features are: (1) consumers must have the old product to enjoy the
upgrade price; and (2) consumers with the old product can pretend to be non-patrons
and buy the new product afresh. To exercise upgrade pricing, the acquirer has to take
an extra step to identify the existing installed base and offer multiple prices for the same
23
product. Hence, it applies to a more restricted set of M&A.
In our setting, only high type consumers own the old product upon entering period
1. The upgrade policy allows them to reveal their purchase history if their incremental
utility from the new product is lower than that of low type consumers. The acquirer
can then differentiate consumers and charge low type consumers an even higher price if
necessary. This will happen when consumers are homogeneous.
On the other hand, when consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous, the new product
will give a higher incremental utility to high type consumers than low type consumers. In
this case, an upgrade policy will not affect high type consumers. However, it allows the
acquirer to credibly charge a high price for the new product if consumers cannot present
the old product. Hence, it encourages low type consumers to buy the old product in
order to qualify for the new product’s upgrade price in the future. The next proposition
summarizes the outcomes in M&A with an upgrade policy.
Proposition 5 With M&A and an upgrade policy, the acquirer will:
(i) sell the new product to both high and low type consumers in period 1, i.e., {1 : N →
H,L}, if and only if
vHL ≤ Υ2 or Υ2 < vHL ≤ min{ Υ11−dL ,Υ1 +
dL
1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)}.
(ii) sell the new product to high type consumers in period 1 and low type consumers in
period 2, i.e., {1 : N → H; 2 : N → L}, if and only if
vHL > Υ2, v
H
L >
Υ1
1−dL , and dL <
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qO,n−1) .
(iii) sell the old product to low type consumers and new product to high type consumers
in period 1, and the new product to low type consumers in period 2, i.e., {1 : N →
H,O → L; 2 : N → L}, if and only if
vHL > Υ2, v
H
L > Υ1 +
dL
1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1) , and dL ≥
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qO,n−1) .
Figure 4 illustrates the outcomes with M&A and an upgrade policy using the same
parameters and scale as Figure 3. Analogous to Observation 1, the acquirer will shelf the
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old product when consumers are homogeneous. In addition, upgrade pricing facilitates
static price discrimination. When consumers are homogeneous, viz. when vHL ≤ Υ2, high
type consumers have a lower incremental utility from the new product than low type
consumers in period 1. Without an upgrade policy, the acquirer may use intertemporal
price discrimination a` la Proposition 3(i), selling the new product sequentially to low and
high type consumers. With an upgrade policy, the acquirer can directly charge low type
consumers a higher price than high type consumers because they do not have the old
product. Such static price discrimination helps advance selling the new product to high
type consumers to period 1. It also enables the acquirer to extract all consumer surplus
because consumers can now be differentiated by purchase history.
More importantly, with such static price discrimination, the acquirer does not need
to wait for the installed base to depreciate before selling the new product to high type
consumers (note that deferring selling the new product to high type consumers itself
causes wastage as the unsold new product also depreciates over time). Hence, it helps
minimize the opportunity loss due to waiting, and so it strictly dominates the intertem-
poral price discrimination strategy, {1 : N → L; 2 : N → H}, even though the latter can
sometimes extract consumer surplus perfectly. Observation 2 – the perfect intertemporal
price discrimination result – no longer applies. In fact, the acquirer will never want to
serve low type consumers exclusively before high type consumers now. This static price
discrimination facilitated by upgrade pricing, when applied, also enhances social welfare
as all consumers will get the new product in period 1.
On the other hand, when consumers are heterogeneous, viz. when vHL > Υ2, upgrade
pricing will not affect high type consumers. However, it helps the acquirer pose a credible
threat to low type consumers – if they do not buy the old product in period 1, then they
will have to pay a higher price for the new product in the future. This threat of (future)
price discrimination based on purchase history helps alleviate the cannibalization caused
by selling the old and new products sequentially to low type consumers. The acquirer can
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Figure 4: Equilibrium outcomes with M&A and an upgrade policy
sell the new product to high type consumers in period 1 concurrently because its price
exceeds what low type consumers are willing to pay.
Accordingly, the option to offer upgrade pricing empowers the acquirer to make
more profit from simultaneously selling the old and new products to low and high type
consumers in period 1 without worrying about cannibalization in the future. This result
applies even when consumers are heterogeneous and the market contains many low type
consumers (recall these two conditions are the facilitators for delayed product introduc-
tion in the earlier analysis), meaning Observation 3 no longer applies. The competitive
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market outcome, which differs from delayed product introduction by sequentially selling
the products to low type consumers earlier, will more likely occur now.
Observation 4 With M&A and an upgrade policy, the acquirer can earn more from the
product sequence in competition, {1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L}. In addition to
the markets characterized in Proposition 3(v), the competition outcome will also occur in
all markets characterized in Proposition 5(iii) with dL <
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qO,1)
, vHL ≤ Υ1 + dL1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] , or v
H
L <
δ(1+dL)U(qO,1)−δU(qN ,1)
(1−δ)(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] when n = 3.
Interestingly, Proposition 5(ii) shows that when consumers are heterogeneous and
the market does not contain many low type consumers, the acquirer will not sell the
new product to low type consumers in period 1 because doing so will constrain the
price chargeable to high type consumers. Further, in the markets characterized in the
second condition of Proposition 5(i), i.e., when consumers are moderately heterogeneous,
although the acquirer wants to serve low type consumers in period 1, it will not be able to
differentiate low and high type consumers by upgrade pricing. Taken together, these two
conditions characterize markets in which upgrade pricing will not be deployed because it
will not be effective anyway. They may explain why in some real world markets firms
do not offer upgrade pricing despite it is feasible to do so. For example, Apple does not
offer an upgrade policy for its celebrated iPhone. We wonder if it is because Apple has
many high valuation customers who are willing to pay a high price for the next-generation
iPhone despite they already have an older generation one.
Finally, Proposition 4 applies with maximum social welfare achieved in the markets
characterized in Proposition 5(i). Comparing Propositions 3 and 5, and Figures 3 and 4,
offering an upgrade policy after M&A can sometimes help even high type consumers get
the new product earlier, specifically, in all markets characterized in Proposition 3(i) and
(iv). This is again because the acquirer can exercise static instead of intertemporal price
discrimination, and so cannibalization is of less concern.
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Nevertheless, this power to exercise static price discrimination after M&A can de-
crease social welfare too. Because the acquirer can now segment the market by selling
the old product to low type consumers, it has lower urgency to sell the new product to
them (deferring selling the new product to low type consumers may allow the acquirer to
charge a higher price to the high type consumers). Hence, in some markets, allowing for
upgrade pricing can decrease social welfare because the acquirer will shift from strategy
{1 : N → H,L} to strategy {1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L}. Even with this proviso,
however, because the upgrade policy is optional, the acquirer’s profit with an upgrade
policy will never be lower than that without an upgrade policy.
Proposition 6 After M&A, the acquirer’s profits with an upgrade policy weakly dominate
its profits without an upgrade policy. Compared with the case of M&A without an upgrade
policy, M&A with an upgrade policy will:
(i) maximize social welfare in all markets characterized in Proposition 3(i) and Propo-
sition 5(i) with vHL >
U(qN ,2)−dLU(qO,2)
δ(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] when n = 3;
(ii) decrease social welfare when
Υ1 +
dL
1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1) < v
H
L ≤ Υ1 + dL1−dL +
δU(qO,n−2)
(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] ≤ Υ11−dL
and vHL ≤ U(qN ,2)−dLU(qO,2)δ(1−dL)[U(qN ,1)−U(qO,1)] when n = 3.
To conclude, the upgrade policy facilitates static price discrimination, which tends
to favor selling the new product to consumers who already own the old product earlier.
For consumers who do not own any product, it helps ease the cannibalization between the
old and new products, which allows the acquirer to make more profit from sequentially
selling the old and new products to them (cf. no upgrade policy). This additional profit,
ironically, may cause low type consumers to get the new product later when their valuation
for quality is considerably lower than that of high type consumers.
Proposition 6 offers a novel insight on why firms seek customer records in M&A.
For example, when Toysmart.com filed for bankruptcy protection in 2000, it list its cus-
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tomer database as one salable asset. Amazon.com states on its privacy notice: “As we
continue to develop our business, we might sell or buy stores, subsidiaries, or business
units. In such transactions, customer information generally is one of the transferred
business assets.” An ostensible reason for firms to acquire customer records is to predict
consumer preferences or offer customized services (Garfinkel et al., 2007; Li et al., 2011;
Tsai et al., 2011). Our analysis suggests they may use such records simply for static price
discrimination (Taylor, 2004; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2006).
4.3. Will A Merger Happen?
For M&A to happen, the benefit must be compatible with the vendors’ incentives, mean-
ing the acquirer must make more profit than the incumbent and entrant. Otherwise, they
will not acquire the other party. As discussed above, the vendors suffer from competition,
cannibalization, and time inconsistency in the competitive market. A merger can help
evade competition and ease cannibalization. Hence, it should lead to increased overall
profit. The next proposition shows that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 7 The acquirer’s profits after M&A weakly dominate the sum of the incum-
bent’s and entrant’s profits in the competitive market.
Given that M&A brings benefit, the vendors should have incentives to merge with
others. This may be the underlying motivation for many IT M&A (Banker et al., 2011;
Tanriverdi and Uysal, 2011; EY, 2015). Instead of acquiring new technologies, our analysis
suggests that they may be motivated by product portfolio planning or, simply, just the
option to remove competitors’ products from the market.
4.4. Different Discount Factors
We now consider an extension where the vendors and consumers have different discount
factors. Let θ and δ be the vendors’ and consumers’ discount factors. Following similar
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analysis as in Section 3, for the installed base to form in period 0, we must have dHv
H
L >
1+ dLU(qO,n−1)
U(qO,1)
(δ−θ). Comparing with Assumption 1, if the incumbent is less patient, i.e.,
θ < δ, then intertemporal price discrimination becomes less attractive. The incumbent
will more likely serve the entire market in period 0. By contrast, if the incumbent is more
patient, i.e., θ > δ, then intertemporal price discrimination is more attractive, meaning
an installed base of the old product will more likely form after period 0.
In general, when the vendors are less patient, i.e., θ < δ, they tend to favor strategies
that sell the products earlier. This can change the equilibrium product sequence in the
competition setting. In particular, Proposition 2 may not hold because if θ is sufficiently
small, the entrant may choose to penetrate the market with the new product immediately
in period 1 instead of delaying selling it to low type consumers in period 2. When this
happens, the incumbent will not be able to sell any product in period 1. Proposition 2
will continue to apply if the entrant is more patient than consumers.
By contrast, allowing for different discount factors will not alter the equilibrium
strategies under M&A with or without upgrade policy. It will only shift the boundaries
between the optimal strategies in Figures 3 and 4. Accordingly, most of the results in
the M&A setting will continue to apply. Because Observations 2 and 3 involve delayed
revenues for the acquirer, the corresponding strategies, viz. perfect intertemporal price
discrimination and delayed product introduction, will less (more) likely occur when the
acquirer is relatively less (more) patient than consumers.
Finally, we have assumed δ < 1. What if δ = 1, i.e., the vendors and consumers are
perfectly patient? As the vendors want to sell to consumers earlier under competition
and upgrade policy can resolve the cannibalization caused by the existing installed base,
the outcomes in the competitive market and M&A with an upgrade policy will remain
unchanged. In M&A without an upgrade policy, strategy {1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N →
L} will become sub-optimal because the acquirer is not eager to capture early profits
from low type consumers (doing so will reduce the profit it can earn from selling the
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new product to them in the future). Hence, the competitive market outcome, {1 : N →
H,O → L; 2 : N → L}, which causes the greatest cannibalization among the new product
and the existing installed base, will not occur. This difference, however, will not affect
the qualitative insights of all propositions and observations derived above.
4.5. Strategic Players
We next explore the outcomes when Assumption 3 is violated, i.e., if the incumbent
anticipates the new product. Referring to Proposition 2, with competition, the incumbent
will sell the old product in period 1 to low type consumers. However, it now foresees it
will not be able to charge a high price for the old product in period 1. Hence, its expected
profit from intertemporal price discrimination will decrease (cf. when it is myopic). This
implies the consumers have to be more heterogeneous than the condition in Assumption 1
for the incumbent to prefer intertemporal price discrimination. The incumbent will more
likely cover the market completely in period 0. When this happens, all consumers will
own the old product in period 1. The problem will degenerate to a standard multi-period
pricing problem with heterogeneous consumers (see, for example, the analysis in Acquisti
and Varian, 2005; Bhargava and Choudhary, 2008; Choudhary, 2010).
What if M&A can happen in period 0, i.e., before the new product arrives? For
example, IT vendors such as Apple and Google often acquire start-up firms with forth-
coming technologies that complement their existing products. If consumers are myopic,
then Proposition 7 will apply because the acquirer can always use the strategies discussed
in Section 4.2. Interestingly, being myopic means consumers are willing to pay a higher
price for the old product, and so the acquirer will want to sell it to them in period 0.
This will happen, for example, in the markets characterized in Propositions 3(iii) and
5(ii). Hence, although our analysis assumes M&A can occur only in period 1, some of its
results may continue to apply if the M&A happens earlier. The case of M&A happening
in period t > 1 is trivial. Hence, we omit it from the paper.
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Finally, what if the consumers are also strategic, i.e., they anticipate the new prod-
uct? Then, it will be difficult for the incumbent to sell the old product in period 0
because consumers know they will have more options in the future. This implies the
incumbent’s price in period 0 will be subject to more constraints. Resolving all of these
pricing constraints is challenging but necessary in characterizing the full benefits of M&A.
We defer such analysis to future research. In any case, the assumption of myopic or naive
consumers is customary in many studies of dynamic consumer choices (see, e.g., Taylor,
2004; Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Liu and Zhang, 2013).
5. Implications
The following table summarizes the observations of product strategies in different mar-
kets. In general, an entrant with a new and better product will prefer to sell to existing
consumers who own the earlier generation of the same product as soon as possible. Com-
petition will not maximize social welfare. M&A can help maximize social welfare in some
markets, but it can decrease social welfare too (e.g., when delayed product introduction
occurs). The vendors in a competitive (duopoly) market have an economic incentive to
form a coalition. This incentive is stronger when the acquirer can determine who possess
the old product and exercise upgrade pricing accordingly.
Our analysis provides a number of important implications for the ongoing research
on M&A and product line design and pricing. First, it shows that product nature can
interact with market structure to affect consumers’ product consumption and welfare.
When the product is subject to depreciation or economic obsolescence and when there is
an existing installed base, competition need not be good and consolidation need not be bad
for consumers. Future research should integrate product nature as one key consideration
in studying the optimal market structure for IT products.
Second, we theoretically establish “shelving a product” and “delayed new product
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Table 1: Summary of Observations
Competition
M&A without
upgrade policy
M&A with upgrade
policy
Observation 1: Shelving the
old product
No
All markets in
Proposition 3(i)-(iii)
All markets in Propo-
sition 5(i)-(ii)
Observation 2: Perfect
intertemporal price
discrimination
No
All markets in
Proposition 3(i),
second condition
No
Observation 3: Delayed new
product introduction
No
All markets in
Proposition 3(iv);
only when n = 3
No
Observation 4: Competitive
market product sequence (1 :
N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L)
Yes
All markets in
Proposition 3(v); only
when δ < 1
All markets in Propo-
sition 5(iii)
introduction” via M&A as feasible product strategies in IT markets. These strategies can
be optimal because they help ease cannibalization despite the vendor cannot alleviate
time inconsistency through controlling the pace of R&D (cf. Dhebar, 1994; Fishman and
Rob, 2000; Kornish, 2001). It is important for future work to account for the vendor’s
options to retire or postpone a product on top of its ability to influence the progress of
technological development.
Third, we find that second-degree, or indirect, price discrimination can be perfect
in terms of capturing consumer surplus. This finding is striking as previous research
suggests even monopoly vendors cannot capture all consumer surplus with second-degree
price discrimination (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Moorthy, 1984). It is founded on the setting
where some consumers possess an old product that depreciates over time, and hence the
intertemporal change in consumer valuations allows the vendor to “sort” consumers per-
fectly. It highlights the importance of identifying dynamic changes in consumer valuations
when assessing different price discrimination strategies.
Finally, most IT products encompass multiple generations because of technological
improvement. It is important to address the existing installed bases of old products
when studying the optimal timing and pricing of new IT products. Such installed bases
may cannibalize new product sales but at the same time provide another instrument for
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vendors to segment consumers or exercise price discrimination.
What are the managerial implications of our findings? Obviously, launching a new
product requires careful planning especially when there is an existing installed base of
old products. The key decision parameters are consumer heterogeneity, vHL , and mix,
dL, and whether M&A and upgrade pricing are feasible. The main advantage of M&A
is that the acquirer will have many more options in timing and pricing its products.
The main advantage of upgrade pricing is that it facilitates static pricing discrimination,
allowing the acquirer to offer a cheaper price to high type consumers (when consumers are
homogeneous) or encourage low type consumers to buy the old product (when consumers
are heterogeneous). These advantages can be realized only when the acquirer gains a
deep understanding of market characteristics and mix of consumers.
We find that the acquirer weakly prefers upgrade pricing after M&A, meaning it
will often seek to offer a different price for the new product to former patrons. The social
welfare implication of such upgrade pricing is not unequivocal. In the markets charac-
terized in Observation 4 and Proposition 6(i), i.e., when consumers are heterogeneous
with many low type consumers or homogeneous with moderate number of low type con-
sumers, allowing firms to transfer customer databases or identify previously sold products
in M&A can be good, at least in terms of speeding up new product consumption. This
may apply to IT markets with frequent product innovations and entry and exit of vendors
(e.g., mobile communications services or computer software).
However, upgrade pricing can be bad or ineffective in other markets. When this is
the case, the acquirer’s urge to offer upgrade pricing should be suppressed, perhaps by
helping consumers conceal their purchase history. Here again, having an accurate assess-
ment of consumer heterogeneity and mix is fundamental to making proper judgments on
whether upgrade pricing should be encouraged.
Further, our analysis establishes an intriguing incentive for M&A, viz. to shelf an
old product (cf., expanding market size or product portfolio, see, e.g., Shaked and Sutton,
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1990; Banker et al., 2011). If a vendor finds it challenging to compete with other vendors
selling low quality products, then a good strategy is to acquire the competitors and retire
their products. The additional revenues obtained from raising the new product’s price
after the merger may well be sufficient to fund the acquisition.
Finally, competition will not maximize social welfare in our setting. In the mar-
kets characterized in Propositions 3(ii) (without upgrade policy) and 5(i) (with upgrade
policy), the policy maker should encourage M&A as it will increase social welfare. Ironi-
cally, when competition and cannibalization are imminent, a good way to facilitate early
consumption of better products by all consumers is to encourage a merger instead of
promoting competition. The acquirer will then be able to optimize the path of product
introduction which, by our theoretical analysis, can often benefit the consumers.
At this point it is important to acknowledge our limitations. This study is norma-
tive in nature. Our objective is to explore how an IT vendor should react when facing
competition from another vendor, when new product entry is unexpected, and when
some consumers have variously purchased an old product to form an installed base. We
integrate the key economic considerations – competition, cannibalization, and time in-
consistency – in a single framework to advise what the vendors can do to maximize their
profits and social welfare. Because of such holistic consideration, we can pin down some
novel strategies that have not been well articulated in the literature. Our strategies help
plan for the optimal price and product paths in general IT markets.
However, our study is not positivist in nature. We do not intend to explain what
has actually happened in any real-world IT market. There are obvious drawbacks in
our model – we study only a duopoly, assume negligible marginal costs that may apply
only to some IT products, and assume exogenous R&D that seems more applicable to
technologies of general interest. We also assume a closed market without new players, and
M&A can occur only from period 1 onward. We argue our setting captures unexpected
entry of new products, which is not uncommon in the IT world (for example, the entry
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of Apple to the watch market and Google to the global positioning system market may
have caught the incumbents by surprise). Obviously, future research may relax some of
these assumptions.
6. Conclusions
We study an important source of consumer heterogeneity, viz. purchase history, and
illustrate how it affects the demand dynamics when the vendors and consumers cannot
anticipate future products in an IT market. We show that vendors have economic incen-
tives to form a coalition, which may variously increase or decrease social welfare and does
not always speed up new product introduction. We identify the motivations of several
intriguing strategies, including forming a coalition to shelf the old product, targeting low
valuation consumers followed by high valuation consumers, and delaying selling the new
product. They present novel strategic justifications for M&A.
How are our results relevant to real-life practice? As discussed above, we observe
experiences of firms such as Apple and Microsoft that seem reasonably consistent with
the strategic choices identified here. Delayed new product introduction seems common
in some IT markets. For example, the technologies for fourth generation (4G) mobile
telephone services has been available for some time, but to-date many service providers
are still offering third or even second generation cellular services. Some software vendors
such as Microsoft has been pushing back selling new versions of their software. It is
entirely possible that their new products are not ready, but they could well be tackling
cannibalization through the mechanisms identified in this paper too.
Future research may extend this work in several meaningful ways. First, we should
examine if prompting consumers about future products (i.e., relaxing Assumption 3)
would affect the benefits of M&A. Second, analyzing the case with positive marginal
costs may extend our insights to other markets. Finally, empirically testing our theory
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using market-level data will help validate our recommendations.
Appendix
The computations of the vendors’ pricing, profit, and equilibrium strategies, and their comparisons in
the three scenarios – under competition, with acquisition and no upgrade policy, and with acquisition
and upgrade policy – are reported in Sections A, B, and C in the Online Supplement. In this Appendix
we present only the summary proofs of the propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1
Note that Υ(t+1)−Υ(t) = U(qN ,n−t)U(qN ,n−t)−U(qO,n−t−1) −
U(qN ,n−t+1)
U(qN ,n−t+1)−U(qO,n−t) =
qN (1−δn−t)
qN (1−δn−t)−qO(1−δn−t−1) −
qN (1−δn−t+1)
qN (1−δn−t+1)−qO(1−δn−t) , which has the sign of −qNqOδn−t−2(1 − δ)2 < 0 for all t. Hence, Υ(t) is
monotonically decreasing in t. This also implies, for any t < n, there must exist some vHL such that
Υ(t+ 1) ≤ vHL ≤ Υ(t), as Υ(t) > 1 for all t < n.
Now, pick any one such vHL and the corresponding t = tˆ < n such that Υ(tˆ + 1) ≤ vHL ≤ Υ(tˆ).
Because Υ(t) is monotonically decreasing in t, vHL ≤ Υ(tˆ) implies vHL ≤ Υ(t), or hHNt ≤ bLNt, for all
t ≤ tˆ. Similarly, vHL ≥ Υ(tˆ + 1) implies vHL ≥ Υ(t), or hHNt ≥ bLNt, for all t ≥ tˆ + 1. Finally, note that if
vHL ≥ Υ(1), then hHNt ≥ bLNt for all t.
Proof of Proposition 2
Referring to Section A of the Online Supplement, the optimal strategies for the incumbent and entrant
are {1 : O → L} and {1 : N → H; 2 : N → L}, which is the first part of the result. With these strategies,
the combined utility of all consumers is dHvHU(qN , n) + dLvL[U(qO, 1) + δU(qN , n− 1)], which always
exceeds the sum of the incumbent’s and entrant’s profits.
Proof of Proposition 3 and Observations 1-3
Referring to the summary table in Section B of the Online Supplement, which characterizes all parametriza-
tion and equilibrium strategies listed in Proposition 3. Observation 1 corresponds to the first seven rows.
Observation 2 corresponds to the third row, which is the only case involving intertemporal price discrim-
ination and satisfying Proposition 1. The acquirer’s total profit here is dLvLU(qN , n)+δdHvH [U(qN , n−
1) − U(qO, n − 2)], which is the sum of consumers’ utility from the new product. Observation 3 corre-
sponds to the eighth row, i.e., the strategy {1 : O → L; 2 : N → H; 3 : N → L}.
Proof of Proposition 4
In considering social welfare, the transfer payment from consumers to sellers does not matter. In our
setting, social welfare is maximized if all consumers buy the new product as early as possible. Proposition
2 shows that this will not happen with competition. Referring to the summary table in Section B of the
Online Supplement, the acquirer will choose strategy {1 : N → H,L} in the second and fourth to sixth
rows. The range of vHL in these four rows correspond to the conditions in Proposition 3(ii).
Proof of Proposition 5 and Observation 4
Referring to the summary table in Section C of the Online Supplement, which characterizes all parametriza-
tion and equilibrium strategies listed in Proposition 5. The conditions in Observation 4 are obtained by
comparing the parametrization in the fourth row in that table against the last row of the summary table
in Section B of the Online Supplement. Figure 4 shows that the product sequence under competition,
{1 : O → L,N → H; 2 : N → L}, will occur in a wide range of parametrization.
Proof of Proposition 6
Comparing the first and third row in the summary table in Section B of the Online Supplement with
the first row in the summary table in Section C, in the parametrization in Proposition 3(i), the acquirer
will choose strategy {1 : N → L; 2 : N → H} without upgrade policy but strategy {1 : N → H,L} with
an upgrade policy. Similarly, the other conditions leading to increasing or decreasing social welfare can
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be obtained by comparing the parametrization in the sixth row in the summary table in Section B with
the second row in the summary table in Section C, both of which concern the strategy {1 : N → H,L}.
Referring to the summary table in Section C of the Online Supplement, for all vHL ≤ Υ2, the ac-
quirer’s profit with upgrade pricing is dHvH [U(qN , n)−U(qO, n−1)] +dLvLU(qN , n)], which is the total
utility that consumers can obtain and so the maximum profit that the acquirer can earn from consuming
the new product in period 1. This implies that its profit with upgrade pricing dominates those in the
first four rows in the summary table in Section B.
Next, when vHL > Υ2, as shown in the summary table in Section C of the Online Supplement,
the acquirer has three candidate strategies. Referring to the summary table in Section B, these three
strategies are also candidate optimal strategies when the acquirer cannot exercise upgrade pricing.
Hence, we simply need to show that each of the three strategies in Section C (with upgrade pric-
ing) weakly dominates the strategies in Section B (without upgrade pricing). As is clear from the
tables, specifically, the rows where vHL > Υ2, the acquirer will earn the same profits with or with-
out upgrade pricing with strategies {1 : N → H,L} and {1 : N → H; 2 : N → L}. With strategy
{1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L}, its profit with upgrade pricing is dLvLU(qO, n− 1) + dHvH [U(qN , 1)−
U(qO, 1)] + δvL[U(qN , n − 1) − U(qO, n − 2)], which exceeds its profit from the same strategy without
upgrade pricing, dLvLU(qO, 1) + dHvH [U(qN , 1)− U(qO, 1)] + δvL[U(qN , n− 1)− U(qO, n− 2)], and its
profit from strategy {1 : O → L; 2 : N → H; 3 : N → L}, dLvLU(qO, 2) + δdHvH [U(qN , 1)− U(qO, 1)] +
δ2vL[U(qN , n− 2)− U(qO, n− 3)]. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
We first compare the combined profits of the entrant and incumbent in the competitive market against
the vendor’s profits in the case with acquisition but no upgrade policy. Referring to Section A of the
Online Supplement, when vHL ≤ Υ1, the combined profit of the incumbent and entrant is
ΠC = (vH − dLvL)[U(qN , 1)− U(qO, 1)] + δvL[U(qN , n− 1)− U(qO, n− 2)]. (1)
Referring to Section B of the Online Supplement, specifically, case 4 in period 1, when vHL ≤ Υ1, the
vendor’s profit is exactly ΠC . Accordingly, the vendor’s profit with acquisition is identical to the com-
bined profit of the incumbent and entrant whenever {1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L} is a candidate
strategy. Referring to the summary table in Section B of the Online Supplement, this strategy is always
dominated by other strategies. Hence, acquisition always gives higher overall profits.
Next, when vHL > Υ1,
ΠC = dLvLU(qO, 1) + dHvH [U(qN , 1)− U(qO, 1)] + δvL[U(qN , n− 1)− U(qO, n− 2)]. (2)
Referring to Section B of the Online Supplement, this is again exactly identical to the vendor’s profit
with strategy {1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → L} in case 4 in period 1, which, according to the summary
table, is a candidate equilibrium strategy when vHL > Υ1. Hence, the vendor’s profits with acquisition
will weakly dominate the combined profit of the incumbent and entrant (the profits are equal when
{1 : N → H,O → L; 2 : N → H} is the equilibrium strategy).
We next compare the combined profit of the incumbent and entrant in the competition case against
the vendor’s profits in the case with acquisition and upgrade policy. Referring to Section C of the Online
Supplement, specifically, case 4 in period 1, the vendor’s profit with strategy {1 : N → H,O → L; 2 :
N → L} always exceeds the ΠC in (1) when vHL ≤ Υ1, and the ΠC in (2) when vHL > Υ1. Accordingly,
acquisition always gives higher overall profits.
Taken together, the vendor’s profits with acquisition (with or without upgrade policy) weakly
dominate the combined profit of the incumbent and entrant in the competitive market.
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